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The Transfer of Water from an International Border
Region: A Tale of Six Cities and the All
American Canal
Albert Utton*
What are the international legal implications of transferring
water from an international border region if that transfer adversely
affects users on the other side of the international boundary? This
question is being raised in the U.S.-Mexico border region and cre-
ates interesting questions in light of the 1944 Colorado River
Treaty.'
I. Introduction
A zero sum game is being played in the arid southwest. A game
in which if someone wins, someone else has to lose. The players are
the United States and Mexico in the larger sense, but more precisely,
it is a tale of three pairs of cities. The real players in this high stakes
game are: Phoenix and Tucson, Arizona; San Diego and Los Ange-
les, California; and Mexicali and Tijuana, Mexico. Phoenix is grow-
ing rapidly in the Arizona desert (Arizona aptly meaning arid zone in
Spanish). Tucson until recently was the United States' largest city
totally dependent on groundwater.2 Los Angeles and San Diego,
both of which are located on California's southern coastal plain, are
faced with the prospect of a collision between dynamically expanding
populations and the loss of over one-half of their Colorado River
water supplies to Arizona. 3 In Mexico, the city of Mexicali, located in
the Colorado River Basin, has temperatures which exceed 100 de-
grees fahrenheit for more than 100 days per year and receives less
Member, New Mexico Bar and Barrister at Law of the Inner Temple of the English
Bar; Professor-of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law; Editor-in-Chief of the
Natural Resources Journal; Director of the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Resources Center;
B.A., University of New Mexico; M.A. Juris), Oxford University; J.D., Yale Law School.
I Treaty Respecting Utilization of the Colorado. and Tijuana Rivers and the Rio
Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, United States-Mexico, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994. The purpose of
the Treaty was to provide for allocations of the Colorado River, Tijuana River, and the Rio
Grande.
2 Sudman, The Central Arizona Project, WESTERN WATER, May/June 1985, at 4 [herein-
after Sudman].
3 River of Controversy, WESTERN WATER, July/August 1985, at 7.
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than three inches of rainfall per annum.4 Its growth rate exceeded
2,011% between 1940 and 1970.5 Tijuana relies on Colorado River
water via a transmountain aqueduct, and its population doubled or
tripled during each decade from the 1930s to the 1970s. Both of
these Mexican cities have a population of approximately one million
people and continue to grow rapidly.6
Arizona has now begun to take its allocation decreed by the U.S.
Supreme Court under the twenty-five year old Arizona v. California
decision. 7 In the intervening years, Los Angeles and San Diego have
come to rely upon the "surplus" of Arizona's entitlement which went
unused by Arizona. Originally, Los Angeles and San Diego could
depend on 1,212,000 acre-feet of Colorado River water per year.
Now, these two cities are losing 662,000 acre-feet of the Colorado
River water they had come to depend on and consequently are hav-
ing to adjust to only 550,000 acre-feet per year of their vested enti-
tlement.8 To adapt to this shortfall, the Metropolitan Water District,
which supplies both San Diego and Los Angeles with water, has
searched for other sources. It found what appeared to be a perfect
candidate, the All-American Canal, 9 which is located entirely within
United States national territory. The canal parallels the U.S.-Mexi-
can border, and delivers precious Colorado River water to the
nearby half-million irrigated acres of the Imperial Irrigation District
(IID), the largest single user of Colorado River water. The All-
American is unlined as it heads due west through the Sonora Desert,
and it "loses" through seepage substantial amounts of the water that
begin the journey to the IID.
By lining the All-American and part of the Coachella Canal,
which branches off the All-American, it is estimated that 100,000
acre-feet of water could be saved each year that would otherwise be
lost.' 0 By modern alchemy, water would be created from desert
sand. However, currently the water is not actually lost; apparently,
much of it simply percolates and migrates underground across the
international boundary where it is used by Mexicans to irrigate
4 IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT, DRAFT WATER CONSERVATION PLAN OF THE IMPE-
RIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT 5 (Jan. 31, 1985)[hereinafter DRAFT WATER CONSERVATION
PLAN].
5 UNITED STATES-MEXICO BORDER STATISTICS SINCE 1900, 11 (Lorey, ed. 1990).
6 Id. The 1980 census figures were 510,664 for Mexicali and 461,257 for Tijuana.
Id.
7 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). The Supreme Court accepted the divi-
sion of the Colorado River water as allocated by the Secretary of the Interior. Until the
present time, California has received a surplus of the Colorado's water because Arizona
lacks the physical facilities to take its fair share under this case, entailing a loss for
California.
8 DRAFT WATER CONSERVATION PLAN, supra note 4, at ES2.
9 Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, Statement of Dec. 8, 1986
[hereinafter Statement of the Metropolitan Water District].
10 Sudman, supra note 2, at 4.
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20,000-30,000 acres of farmland."I It serves as a supplemental sup-
ply for agriculture to compensate for the increasing amounts of
water being taken by Mexicali and Tijuana to supply the demand of
their dramatically growing populations.12
One Mexican official fears that "if this thing [the lining] goes
through, it will mean the end of the Valle." 13 The Valle de Mexicali,
an extension of the California's Imperial Valley, is one of Mexico's
most productive agricultural areas. Perhaps as many as 700 Mexican
wells have been put down to recover water lost from the All-Ameri-
can Canal.14 The fear is that the lining of the canal will interrupt the
recharge of the aquifer which supplies the water for the wells irrigat-
ing thousands of acres of Valle de Mexicali farms.
In the United States, officials are strongly rejecting the Mexican
claim. One official is quoted as stating, "[w]hat we are saying is that
the United States government considers the waters in the All-Ameri-
can Canal to be United States waters, diverted to the United States
under the 1944 [Colorado River] Treaty. The United States has the
right to take whatever measures it wants to conserve those waters."15
Another U.S. official is quoted as saying, "[elven under international
law, any country can improve its public works, such as lining a canal,
without being considered to harm another country."' 6
If in fact significant reductions in groundwater supply occurred
in Mexico as a result of the proposed lining, what would be the legal
ramifications? This Article will examine this question in light of the
1944 Colorado River Treaty and the ways in which the Treaty can be
interpreted through varying applications of the doctines and princi-
ples of general international water law and western water decisions.
This Article will then conclude that although the water in question is
Colorado River water and therefore is governed by the Treaty, it is
not clear that the United States can legally intercept the seepage
water because: (1) the Treaty fails to address the groundwater ques-
tion; (2) western water law decisions indicate that the courts have
sought accommodations that give some protection to users of "seep-
age" water; and (3) the international law of prescription may apply.
This lack of clarity, combined with considerations of international
I I Statement of Metropolitan Water District, supra note 9, at i. For additional articles
describing the current state of the Colorado River and the vast demands placed upon it,
see McDowell & Woodbury, A Fight over Liquid Gold, TIME, July 22, 1991, at 20; Carrier, The
Colorado: A River Drained Dry, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, June 1991, at 4.
12 See supra notes 4 & 5.
13 Interview with Roman Calleros, Director of the Mexicali Office of the College of
the Northern Border (Feb. 1990)[hereinafter Calleros Interview]; see also N. Y. Times, Oct.
1, 1989, at 3, col. 1.
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comity, should lead the United States to search for an accommoda-
tion which would be a "win-win" position for both countries.
II. Putting the Treaty into Context
The international legal dimension of the proposed lining of the
All-American Canal is governed by the specific provisions of the
1944 Colorado River Treaty.17 Nonetheless, it is helpful to put that
Treaty into context by first examining the general international law
principles within which the Treaty fits.
A. International Law Principles
1. The Development of Territorial Sovereignty Theories
a. Initial Stages
During the development of international water law over the
course of the past century, the theory of absolute territorial sover-
eignty, which held that a nation could act within its own territory
without regard to the consequences of the act to neighboring na-
tions, has been rejected. This theory has been replaced by the doc-
trine of limited territorial sovereignty. Under this doctrine, a nation
is prohibited from using water resources within its boundaries in a
way which would unreasonably damage its neighbors. 18
The development of the doctrine of limited territorial sover-
eignty followed a similar development of the common law. The Ro-
man maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedus (so use your own property
as not to injure your neighbor) was perceived as the foundation of
the common law of nuisance by Sir William Blackstone in the early
nineteenth century. 19 Likewise, international law has followed a sim-
ilar development in the case of transboundary pollution. Heading
the list of international judicial decisions in this area is the oft-cited
Trail Smelter decision, 20 which builds on the same principle of sic utere
tuo for international streams and lakes. 2 1
17 See Treaty Respecting Utilization of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and the Rio
Grande, supra note 1.
18 THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS (Garretson, ed. 1967).
19 Blackstone illustrated with the examples that one cannot keep hogs or other
"noisom animals" so near another's house "that the stench of them incommodes him and
makes the air unwholesome" nor can one "corrupt or poison a water course by erecting a
dye-house or a lime pit for the use of trade in the upper part of the stream." Blackstone
not only based the principle on the Roman maxim, but the biblical exhortation as well:
"So closely does the law of England enforce that excellent rule of gospel morality of 'do-
ing to others as we would they should do unto ourselves.' " 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND, 217-18 (Garland Publishing 1978)(9th ed.
1783).
20 Trail Smelter Decision, (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905, 1965 (1941),
reprinted in 35 AM.J. INT'L L. 684, 716-17 (1941).
21 For an extensive survey of treaties see Griffin, The Use of International Drainage Basins
Under Customar International Law, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 50 (1959); Stephen M. Schwebel, Third
Report on the Law of Non-Navigational Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/348 (1982), reprinted in
[VOL. 16
INTERNATIONAL WATER RIGHTS
The Trail Smelter case dealt with international air pollution, but is
analogous to the pollution of international streams and lakes.2 2 A
smelter at Trail, British Columbia, was causing damage across the
border in the United States. After hearing the case, the arbitral tribu-
nal held "that, under the principles of international law no state has
the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as
to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another ... when the
cause is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear
and convincing evidence. ' 23
b. The Current Stage. Equitable Apportionment
In the case of international water resources, the principle of lim-
ited territorial sovereignty was a founding principle upon which the
more comprehensive concept of equitable apportionment (or utiliza-
tion) was erected. Under equitable apportionment, each co-riparian
is entitled to an equitable share of the uses of the water of a river
system. Griffin further developed the limited territorial sovereignty
principle by using the language of equitable utilization in declaring
that "riparians are entitled to share in the use and benefits of a sys-
tem of international waters on ajust and reasonable basis."'2 4 Nearly
a decade later, Lipper, in summarizing the conclusions of the New
York University International Rivers Research Project, stated that in-
ternational authority "endorses the limited sovereignty principle
which embraces equitable utilization, as it is sometimes termed equi-
table apportionment, with respect to both contiguous and successive
international rivers." 2 5
From the vantage of the last decade of the twentieth century,
one can reasonably conclude that international practice, as evi-
denced by treaties, judicial decisions, statements of individual schol-
ars, and private and public international bodies, has rejected the
assertion of absolute territorial sovereignty in favor of the principle
of limited territorial sovereignty. This principle, in turn, has been
refined and is currently expressed in terms of the doctrine of equita-
ble apportionment or utilization. Under this doctrine, a co-riparian
of an international water system cannot unilaterally use or divert
water so as to injure another riparian. Instead, the co-riparian must
share the use of international water as the waters must be equitably
[1982] Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 65, Add. 1, Vol. II, pt. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1982/Add.l (Part 1).
22 The tribunal itself said, "[n]o case of air pollution dealt with by an international
tribunal has been brought to the attention of the tribunal .... The nearest analogy is that
of water pollution." 35 AM.J. INT'L L. 684, 714 (1941).
23 Id.
24 Griffin, supra note 21, at 77-79.
25 J. Lipper, Equitable Utilization, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS at
62-63 (A. Garretson, R. Hayton & C. Olmstead, eds. 1967).
1991]
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
apportioned or utilized. 26
The Helsinki Rules, 27 the most recognized expression of the in-
ternational law of rivers, reflect this development. The Helsinki
Rules assume limited territorial sovereignty and are founded on the
principle of equitable utilization or apportionment. Article IV pro-
vides that "[e]ach basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a rea-
sonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an
international drainage basin."'28 Furthermore, article V follows the
lead of earlier judicial decisions by elaborating: "[w]hat is a reason-
able and equitable share within the meaning of Article IV is to be
determined in the light of all the relevant factors in each particular
case."29
2. Other Principles from Practice: Acquifers and Groundwater
A more limited international practice exists in the area of trans-
boundary aquifers, yet by analogy, in light of the international and
interstate law of rivers, it can be said that:
1) no one party is entitled to all of the waters of a transboundary
aquifer;
2) the use of the waters of the aquifer must be equitably shared by
those parties which overlie it; and
3) no one party may unilaterally determine its share.30
In 1986, the International Law Association adopted specific
rules dealing with groundwater.3 ' Article 2(1) provides that, "[a]n
aquifer that.., receives water from surface waters of an international
basin constitutes part of that basin for purposes of the Helsinki
Rules." 3 2 This in turn makes the Helsinki Rules specifically applica-
ble to groundwaters, as article IV provides that, "[e]ach basin State is
entitled within its territory to an equitable share ... of the waters...
of an international drainage basin."33
3. The Colorado River Treaty and the Question that Remains
In the specific case of the Colorado River, the United States and
26 Schwebel, supra note 21, at 74.
27 Helsinhi Rules on the Uses of Waters of International Rivers, International Law Associa-
tion Reports of the Fifty-Second Congress 477-531 (1966).
28 Id. at 486.
29 Id. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259
U.S. 419 (1922); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 805 (1931); Nebraska v. Wyoming,
325 U.S. 589 (1945).
30 See Utton, Sporhase, El Paso, and the Unilateral Allocation of Water Resources: Some Reflec-
tions on International and Interstate Groundwater Law, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 549, 550 (1986); see
also Hayton & Utton, Transboundart, Groundwaters: The Bellagio Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 773 (1989).
31 International Water Resources Law, International Law Association Reports of the Fifty-
Second Congress 231 (1966).




Mexico have determined, by mutual and amicable agreement, the
"reasonable and equitable" share of each country. By treaty,
1,500,000 acre-feet per year was allocated to Mexico, while the other
waters in the Colorado River drainage basin were allocated to the
United States.3 4
The groundwaters in the Mexicali Valley are return flows or
seepage water from the Colorado River. Accordingly, the United
States is correct in its assertion that the Colorado River waters have
already been allocated by mutual agreement under the 1944 Treaty.
Nevertheless, one question remains: even if the source of the
groundwater is the surface flow from the Colorado River, and even if
this surface flow has been allocated, does the United States have the
right to interrupt return flows by lining the canal, thus enabling it to
recapture seepage waters upon which Mexican farmers have devel-
oped a dependency and corresponding expectancy over the course
of several decades?
In search of the answer to this question, western water law cases
provide some illumination by providing some degree of insight as to
the manner in which decision-makers have responded to somewhat
similar questions in the past.
B. U.S. Water Law: Analogies
1. Land Owners and Conservation Measures
In various U.S. jurisdictions, owners have used waters resulting
from their conservation measures, thus claiming to have benefitted
merely from the fruits of their labor. At first glance, this proposition
seems reasonable enough in light of the added advantage of provid-
ing an incentive for land owners to invest in conservation measures.
However, courts have often disapproved of these measures when
considering the "bigger picture" of the entire hydrologic cycle of the
river.
For example, in Southeastern Colorado Water Conservatory District v.
Shelton Farms, Inc. ,35 the parties reduced evaporation and evapo-tran-
spiration by clearing phreatophytes and filling in marshy land. They
claimed that because their efforts had resulted in the conservation of
water, this water should have been theirs to use, free from the call of
other water users in times of water shortages. The Supreme Court
of Colorado rejected the claim, holding that "since the water in ques-
tion has always been tributary to the stream and was not new to the
river system, it must come under the general system or priorities of
34 The Mexican allocation is delivered in accordance with annual schedules formu-
lated by the Mexican section of the International Water and Boundary Commission before
the beginning of each calendar year. See Treaty Respecting Uitilization of the Colorado
and Tijuana Rivers and the Rio Grande, supra note 1, arts. 10, 15.
35 187 Colo. 181, 529 P.2d 1321 (1974).
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water rights for the river system."'3 6 In effect, the court said that they
had to consider the effect of the loss of return flows to other water
users downstream.
In Salt River Valley Users Association v. Kovacovich,3 7 the Arizona
Court of Appeals similarly rejected a claim for the use of water saved
by conservation measures. Here an owner conserved water by the
improvement and concrete lining of ditches. The owner wanted to
use the conserved water for irrigating immediately adjacent lands.
He argued that a decision prohibiting his usage of the water would
otherwise "result in penalizing persons who, through their industry,
effort and expenses, engage in water saving practices." 3 8 The court
said that "[c]ertainly any effort by users of water in Arizona tending
toward conservation and more economical use of water is to be
highly commended. However, commendable practices do not in
themselves create legal rights."' 39 The court went on to say, "[any
practice, whether through water-saving procedure or otherwise,
whereby appellees may in fact reduce the quantity of water actually
taken inures to the benefit of other water users and neither creates a
right to use the waters saved as a marketable commodity nor the
right to apply same to adjacent property having no appurtenant
water rights."140
In general, the cases reflect rather technical considerations relat-
ing to the doctrine of prior appropriation and the water law of the
particular jurisdictions. Consequently, that which can be usefully
gleaned and transferred by analogy is limited. Nevertheless, at a
minimum, these cases do reflect the kinds of concerns decision mak-
ers will consider. These courts felt the need to consider the overall
hydrologic cycle, possible environmental effects, and the impacts on
other users downstream in the drainage system. The courts were
concerned that by "conserving" the water and putting it to further
use, return flows would be reduced and there would be less water
available for other users downstream. The end result was that the
individual water right holder was not allowed to conserve water and
then use that water himself. At least in this area, one is not guaran-
teed to benefit from the fruits of one's own labor.
2. Transfers of Place of Use
United States water law relating to the transfer of water rights
from one place to another is also instructive. A leading case is Farm-
ers Highline Canal and Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden.4 1 In this case, the
36 Id. at 1324.
37 3 Ariz. App. 28, 411 P.2d 201 (1966).
38 Id. at 29, 411 P.2d at 202.
39 Id. at 29-30, 411 P.2d at 202-03.
40 Id. at 31,411 P.2d at 204.
41 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d 629 (1954)(en banc).
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City of Golden purchased water rights and "sought to have changed,
not only the point of diversion, but likewise, the manner of use." 42
The water right involved had previously been used to divert water
from a ditch (Swadley Ditch) for irrigation, and the City of Golden
now wanted to move the point of diversion five miles downstream to
the headgate of another ditch (Church Ditch) to increase the domes-
tic water supply for the city. The Supreme Court of Colorado clearly
declared that the basic principle to be considered in such an applica-
tion for transferring the place of diversion and use of water is
whether other users will be injured by the change given the hydro-
logic interdependencies of a water system.
[Wlell established, as we have repeatedly held, is the principle
that junior appropriators have vested rights in the continuation of
stream conditions as they existed at the time of their respective ap-
propriations, and that ... they may successfully resist all proposed
changes in points of diversion and use of water from that source
which in any way materially injures or adversely affects their
rights. 43
The court went on to quote with approval one of its earlier decisions,
saying "[t]he well-recognized right to change either the point of di-
version of the water right or its place of use is always subject to the
limitation that such change shall not injure the rights of subsequent
appropriators ."44
The principle difficulty with which water transfer cases have to
deal is the complex hydrologic interdependencies of all users in a
water system.
Since the same water can be used and reused by several per-
sons, all may have water rights that entitle them to receive the same
molecules of water. If the sale and transfer of one person's water
right will result in making those molecules unavailable to another
who also has a right to them, the first user has sold the latter's water
as well as his own.4 5
State courts have acted accordingly. For example, the Supreme
Court of New Mexico has held that a water rights holder can change
the point of diversion "only if it can do so without detriment to the
rights of other water users on the stream." 46 Wyoming requires that
transfers of water rights not be granted if the transfer would "in any
manner injure other existing lawful appropriators. ' 4 7
In comparison to the All-American Canal lining, one observes
42 Id. at 577, 272 P.2d at 630.
43 Id. at 579, 272 P.2d at 631-32.
44 Id. at 580, 272 P.2d at 632 (quoting Enlarged Southside Irr. Ditch Co. v. John's
Flood Ditch Co., 116 Colo. 580, 586, 183 P.2d 552, 555 (1947)).
45 F. TRELEASE, WATER LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 200 (4th ed. 1986) [hereinafter
TRELEASE].
46 W.S. Ranch Company v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 79 N.M. 65, 69, 439 P.2d 714, 718
(1968).
47 See Basin Elec.Power Coop. v. State Bd. of Control, 578 P.2d 557, 561 (Wyo. 1978).
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that these cases protect only the holders of water rights and there-
fore are not strictly relevant to the Imperial Valley situation because
the only right to Colorado River water which Mexico has is the right
to 1,500,000 acre-feet under the 1944 Treaty. However, these cases
illustrate, in a broader sense, the manner in which the same molecule
of water is reused many times by different users and how the law
jealously protects those subsequent users by prohibiting transfers
that would interrupt the hydrologic sequence and thus the water
supply.
3. The Reuse Water Cases
Raising similar considerations is another line of cases which at-
tempt to deal with the reuse of discharge or drainage waters. These
cases are similar in some aspects to the transfer cases even though
they have developed from a slightly different perspective. For exam-
ple, in the Oregon case of Cleaver v. Judd,48 the defendant, an irriga-
tion district, built a drain to alleviate drainage problems caused by
irrigation in the community. After the drain was built, the plaintiffs
used the drainage waters for irrigation. Some years later, the irriga-
tion district constructed a ditch to capture the drainage water for
reuse within the district. The plaintiffs sued to enjoin diversion of
the drainage water for reuse within the district. In finding against
the plaintiffs, the court held that "if the waste and seepage water is
recaptured for reuse within the boundaries of the district, those who
have previously used such waters have no cause of action for having
been deprived of the water."'49 The court cited an earlier California
case 5° for the principal that water may be "subsequently recaptured
so long as the recapture is effected before the water leaves the
owner's land or that of the irrigation district."' 5' The court basically
established that the interception and reuse of drainage water was
permitted if it was: 1) recaptured before it left the land of the owner,
and 2) used on the land of the owner. Furthermore, the Colorado
case of Comstock v. Ramsay52 added that drainage flows cannot be
intercepted and reused on different land.
If one tried to apply these cases to the Mexicali situation, one
might suggest the recaptured seepage water would have to be reused
within the Imperial Irrigation District or at least within the Colorado
River drainage basin; otherwise, all return flows would be lost. One
would have to emphasize that these cases obviously did not contem-
plate an international situation where the owner is a nation. How-
48 238 Or. 266, 393 P.2d 193 (1964)(en banc).
49 Id. at 271, 393 P.2d at 195.
50 Stevens et. al. v. Oakdale Irr. Dist., 13 Cal. 2d 343, 352, 90 P.2d 58, 62 (1939)(per
curiam).
51 Cleaver, 238 Or. at 272, 393 P.2d at 196.
52 55 Colo. 244, 133 P. 1107 (1913)(en banc).
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ever, a Wyoming case provides language friendly to the Mexican
position. In Fuss v. Franks,53 the Supreme Court of Wyoming
declared:
the owner of land upon which seepage or waste water rises has the
right to use and reuse-capture and recapture-such waste waters
for use only upon the land for which the water forming the see page
was originally appropriated. When the water leaves the land for
which it was appropriated and would, if left to flow uninterrupted,
reach a natural stream, it becomes eligible to other and separate ap-
propriation for other and different uses. It leaves the landowner
from which it has escaped, without any superior right to such water
54
In another case, yet another limitation was added as it was held that
the intent to recapture must have existed at the time of appropria-
tion, and that the intent must be exercised within a reasonable
time. 55
The need to exercise the intent to recapture is even more ex-
plicit in the Supreme Court decision in Ide v. United States,56 which
not only has strong echos for the All-American Canal situation, but
also appears to provide support for the United States position. In
this case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the government had the
right to recapture and impound seepage water. The United States
had constructed a canal system through the Bureau of Reclamation.
In spite of the fact that the waters in question had leaked from the
canals, the Court held the water could be recaptured. It held that
water once lawfully in the possession of the United States may, in the
absence of an intent to abandon, be prevented from escaping or may
be recaptured while escaping.57 However, this case does not provide
the solace for the Unites States position that it at first appears to.
Even though this case ruled for recapture, it raises the question of
abandonment. 58 The question of abandonment is raised when non-
use for a sufficiently long time is coupled with an intent to abandon.
The abandonment is a rebuttable presumption. The rebutting party
must demonstrate intent to put the water to beneficial use and pro-
vide some reason explaining the non-use.59
Mexico could be expected to argue that the United States has
53 610 P.2d 17 (Wyo. 1980).
54 Id. at 20.
55 Jones v. Warmsprings Irr. Dist. 162 Or. 186, 195, 91 P.2d 542, 546 (1939). See
TRELEASE, supra note 45, at 229 for a collection of these cases.
56 263 U.S. 497 (1924).
57 Id. at 506.
58 Abandonment was also raised in the 1919 Colorado case of McKelvey v. North
Sterling Irr. Dist., 179 P. 872 (Colo. 1919)(en banc). In that case the irrigation district
sought to prevent the escape of water from its irrigation ditches, and the plaintiff had been
using the escaped water. The court ruled that there was a right to recapture the water
unless the water had been abandoned. Id. at 874.
59 C. F. & 1. Steel Corp. v. Purgatoire River Water Conservancy Dist., 183 Colo. 135,
140, 515 P.2d 456, 458 (1978)(en banc).
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abandoned the seepage water from the All-American Canal. The
U.S. would surely counter that it had not intentionally abandoned
the water, but at all times had intended to recapture the water when
it was needed, which it now is. But the fact that the United States has
not put the water to beneficial use for forty eight years would cast
doubt on the robustness of U.S. intent.60
These contentions are made in light of the observation that the
cases invariably involve an established downstream user who has be-
come dependent on the drainage flow, and who is trying to prevent
the interruption of the flow. A California case, Krieger v. Pacific Gas
and Electric,6 1 provides yet another wrinkle to this classic struggle.
Here, Krieger owned land which was subject to an easement for the
right-of-way for the Utica ditch. When Pacific Gas and Electric ac-
quired the water right, it began to line the ditch by "gunniting" or
spraying it with liquid concrete. Krieger sought an injunction to stop
the concrete lining and the court agreed. The court said the earthen
ditch constituted the limit of the original easement. They held that
the riparian vegetation which depended on the seepage from the
earthen ditch was a benefit enjoyed by the landowner. Thus, the loss
of the seepage would increase the burden of the easement. The
court declared "the water flowing in the ditch is the property of
PG&E, and [Krieger] has no right to the water; however, water which
percolates leaks or seeps through the ditch to [Krieger's] property
thereby becomes his property." 62
One can say a number of things about these cases. They come
from a variety ofjurisdictions and reflect the technical legal factors of
those respective jurisdictions, including the respective constitutional
and legislative environments of each jurisdiction. They also repre-
sent an attempt to accommodate the equities and needs of the origi-
nal appropriator from whose land the water seeps or drains and
those of the user downstream who now relies upon the continuation
of those flows. The courts, in reaching this accommodation, recog-
nized the expectations for continued flow of seepage waters and
placed limits on when and where seepage waters may be intercepted
and recaptured. The key word throughout the cases would be
"accommodation."
III. Groundwater Under the 1944 Colorado River Treaty
The 1944 Treaty specifically allocates a quantity of the surface
flow of the Colorado River to Mexico each year. Furthermore, the
60 For further discussion, Hayes, The All-American Canal Lining Project: The Catalyst for
Rational and Comprehensive Groundwater Management on the United States-Mexico Border? 31 NAT.
RESOURCESJ. - (1991).
61 119 Cal. App. 3d 137, 173 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1981).
62 Id. at 149, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 758.
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Treaty provides that Mexico is granted an annual quantity of 1.5 mil-
lion acre-feet per year "from any and all sources" 63 with the under-
standing that "Mexico shall acquire no right beyond" 64 the specified
1.5 million acre-feet "of the waters of the Colorado River system, for
any purpose whatsoever."'6 5 Although this language seems explicit
and all-inclusive, upon closer review there is room for doubt in the
clarity of its interpretation. The reason is that even though it was
known that there were substantial supplies of groundwater in Baja,
California hydrologically related to the surface flow of the Colorado,
the Treaty is silent regarding the effect of Mexican uses of these
groundwater reserves. 66 Meyers has three separate contentions re-
garding this ambiguity: first, "the negotiators apparently never con-
sidered whether the United States should be given credit for
groundwater utilized by Mexico . .. ",;67 second, the proponents of
the Treaty during the ratification hearings "did not ... appreciate
the possible effects of extensive Mexican use of groundwater"; third,
the proponents may have "realized that the Treaty contained a major
defect which had to be glossed over at such a late date." 68 The re-
sult is that although the language of the Treaty allocating a specific
quantity of the surface flow is quite explicit, the Treaty is not clear
because the negotiators, and therefore the Treaty, did not address
the question of groundwater and the question of rights to seepage
water from the All-American Canal.
Outside of the Treaty issues, the international doctrine of pre-
scription should be considered. If the Treaty does not cover the is-
sue, or is unclear, which it is, then the doctrine of prescription might
be argued. Brierly says "long possession may operate to confirm the
existence of a title the precise origin of which cannot be shown or to
extinguish the title of a prior sovereign."' 69 Hall adds that "title by
prescription arises out of a long continued possession where no orig-
inal source of proprietary right can be shown to exist, or where pos-
session in the first instance being wrongful, the legitimate proprietor
neglected to assert his right or has been unable to do so. ' '70 This is
the concept of "adverse possession which is recognized by almost all
systems of municipal law and appears equally to be admitted by in-
ternational law.' 7
63 See Treaty Respecting Utilization of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and the Rio
Grande, supra note 1, art. 10(a)
64 Id. art. 10(b).
65 Id.
66 Meyers, The Colorado River: The Treaty With Mexico, 19 STAN. L. REV. 367, 415
(1967).
67 Id. at 385.
68 Id. at 416.
69 J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS, 167 (H. Waldock 6th ed. 1963).
70 Id. (quoting W.E. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAw 143 (T.E. Holland 4th ed. 1895).
71 Id. at 169.
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The international law cases cited which apply to the acquisition
of land should be equally applicable to the acquisition of other prop-
erty rights such as water rights. Certainly, the International Court of
Justice in the Anglo Norwegian Fisheries case 72 in dictum appeared to
recognize that prescription could apply to acquire title over areas of
the high seas. Prescription under international law has strong echos
of abandonment. Perhaps the long usage by Mexico of the seepage
waters of the All-American Canal might arguably create a prescrip-
tive right to the continued flow of these groundwaters.
IV. Conclusion
While both Mexico and the United States may be able to make
strong claims to the seepage waters of the All-American Canal, the
right to intercept seepage flows is less than clear. The basic legal
document governing U.S.-Mexico water rights in the Mexicali area is
the 1944 Treaty. The Treaty equitably apportioned the use of the
Colorado River waters, and Mexico was allocated 1,500,000 acre-feet
per year. Mexico receives this water for distribution at Morelos Dam.
Accordingly, it can be argued that any additional seepage water from
the Imperial Irrigation District (IID) would increase the Mexican al-
location beyond that agreed upon by the Treaty in view of the fact
that the water supply of the IID is Colorado River water and a por-
tion of the United States' agreed-upon allocation. If the question in
the All-American Canal case concerns Mexican user rights to a con-
tinuance of the underground flow, then it may be argued that the
only water right Mexico retains is the share of surface flows allocated
under the 1944 Treaty. However, this may not frame the question
broadly enough in view of the value of comity in U.S.-Mexico rela-
tions, the dependency developed by expanding Mexican needs,
73
and competing legal doctrines.
The United States might choose to stand on the letter of the law
of the Treaty and simply contend that "we have delivered that much
to Mexico in the bed of the Colorado; the water in All-American Ca-
nal is our agreed upon share, and we therefore can line the Canal to
save our share for reuse as we see fit." Nevertheless, significant
questions are raised by U.S. water law, the fact that the Treaty does
not address groundwater, and perhaps the international law of pre-
scription. A survey of U.S. western water reveals that U.S. courts
have protected other users in the case of the transfer of water rights
and have placed limits on the recapture of seepage waters from irri-
72 Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.) 1951 I.CJ. 116, 131 (Judgment of Dec. 18).
73 A distinguished Mexican scholar anticipated this problem nearly three decades ago
when he wrote, "[tlhe 1944 Treaty actually froze at a very low level, irretrievably perhaps,
Mexican rights in these waters by not providing for the growth of communities that later
might need the water downstream in Lower California or in Sonora." Sepulvida, Areas of
Dispute in Mexican-American Relations, 17 Sw. L.J. 98, 102 (1963).
490 [VOL. 16
INTERNATIONAL WATER RIGHTS
gation canals. Here again, it reasonably can be argued that this body
of law does not apply to an international water case which is gov-
erned by treaty. Yet, to ignore the reluctance of the U.S. courts to
cut off return flows would be to ignore their sensitivity to interrupt-
ing the flow of water to those who have become dependent on its
continued supply.
Under United States case law, even though the original water
right holder had the prior right, the junior appropriators of the seep-
age water were protected. They generally were water rights holders;
their rights were formally recognized by the appropriate procedure
in that jurisdiction. 74 However, those protected were not always
holders of formal water rights, as was seen in the Krieger case. In that
case, the court specifically held that Krieger had no water right, but
nonetheless stopped the defendant from lining the Utica ditch,
thereby intercepting the seepage water.75 The clear thrust of these
cases is to provide some protection to users of seepage water and to
place limitations on when the holder of a water right may capture
and reuse or transfer water which he had the prior right to use, but
which has now moved on through seepage to other users.
In the capture and reuse situation, some cases have imposed ad-
ditional conditions, such as an intent to recapture both at the time of
appropriation and within a reasonable time. The Treaty has been in
effect more than four decades and the Imperial Irrigation District it-
self has been in existence more than seven decades (since 191 1).76
The policy reason behind requiring the recapture within a reason-
able time is the maximization of the beneficial use and reuse of the
same molecules by protecting junior appropriators who put the
water to beneficial use. Otherwise, the investment necessary to put
the water to beneficial use would not be justified because the water
supply would be unreliable if it were subject to being intercepted and
interrupted by recapture. This "reasonable time" condition could
provide support for the Mexican position. It might be argued that
recapture now, nearly fifty years after the canal began supplying the
74 As were the junior appropriators in Cleaver v. Judd, 238 Or. 266, 393 P.2d 193
(1964), and in Fuss v. Franks, 610 P.2d 17 (Wyo. 1980).
75 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
76 The reuse cases require seepage water may be "recaptured so long as the recap-
ture is effected before the water leaves the owner's land." Cleaver, 238 Or. at 272, 393
P.2d at 196. In this instance, it might be argued that the IID would have to conserve and
recapture the water within the bounds of the irrigation district. Conservation measures
such as lining ditches will easily satisfy the requirement. However, in the larger interna-
tional treaty context the appropriate geographic area would be the bounds of the country
not the irrigation district. Therefore, the capture of the water would clearly be within the
water right holder's land, i.e. the United States. The same considerations would also apply
to the requirement that the reuse has to be on the owner's land. The use would be in the
United States and, therefore, permissible from the larger perspective of the Treaty
(although outside the Colorado River drainage basin therefore obviating all return flows).
Sudman, supra note 2, at 8.
1991]
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
full needs of IID in 1942, is not reasonable. Specifically, the issue
would be raised of whether the United States had abandoned the
right to recapture the seepage especially in view of the fact that the
Mexicans have made substantial investments in the interim and have
come to rely on the seepage as a supplemental supply.
The Imperial Irrigation District proposal involves elements of
both the law of reuse and the law of transfer; the key concept is one
of the capture of seepage water and the transfer of that Colorado
River water outside the drainage basin to California coastal areas. A
central element of the law of recapture and reuse is accommodation,
and the thrust of the law of transfer is that changes in the place of
use "shall not injure the rights of subsequent appropriators." '7 7 It
can be argued that this general policy to protect other water users in
the case of transfers and in the case of seepage waters or return flows
is limited to water rights holders, and that the only right Mexico has
is the 1,500,000 acre-feet under the Treaty. However, this very
question, the question of the extent of the Mexican right to ground-
water, would be a central issue in dispute due to the failure of the
Treaty to address groundwater rights.
Of course there are many exceptions, and Trelease cautions that
the second user of water is not protected against its loss in every case
of change in the manner and form of its first use. 78 Certainly these
western water cases do not have a binding effect on the All-American
Canal case; yet, the reuse cases do wrestle with the same issue be-
tween neighboring domestic users that the All-American case
presents between neighboring nations.
In summary, both the United States and Mexico could make sub-
stantial legal arguments. Each could insist on a decision based on
the letter of the law. The United States clearly has a strong argu-
ment based on the allocation of surface waters under the Treaty,
even though groundwaters were not comprehended within the ex-
plicit language of the Treaty. On the other hand, Mexico could mar-
77 Of course there are many exceptions, and Professor Trelease cautions that "the
second user of water is not protected against its loss in every case of change in the manner
and form of its first use." TRELEASE, supra note 45, at 99. He points to two examples in
which the second user is not protected. In the first case a municipal sewage treatment
plant had discharged effluent above the headgate of an irrigation company. A new plant
was built with its outfall downstream from the irrigation company's point of diversion.
The Colorado court held that the company had no vested right of control over the up-
stream appropriation and that a change in the point of return to the stream is not subject
to a no harm rule. Metropolitan Denver Sewage Disposal Dist. No. I v. Farmers' Reservoir
and Irr. Co., 179 Colo. 36, 499 P.2d 1190 (1972). Trelease also points to A-B Cattle v.
U.S., 196 Colo. 539, 589 P.2d 57 (1978). In this so-called "dirty water case," the irrigators
using the Bessemer Ditch complained that naturally muddy water of the Arkansas River
which helped seal the ditch from leaking had been replaced by clear water from a reservoir
by the Bureau of Reclamation. This caused the ditch to leak and less water to reach the
irrigators. The court held that the irrigators had a water right and not a "silt right" and
denied their claim to compensation.
78 See TRELEASE, supra note 45.
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shall strong support from case law in the United States itself. This
support includes the following: 1) the requirement not to injure
other users, as illustrated by the conservation and transfer cases;
2) the requirement that the recapture and reuse of seepage waters
must be effected within a reasonable time; and 3) the proposition
that seepage waters are presumed abandoned if not recaptured
within a reasonable time.
It would be difficult for the United States to argue that it had
been economically impossible to line the Canal during the nearly
half century of non-use in view of the relative cost of the project
compared to the gross national product of the nation. Non-use over
the course of a long period of time creates a presumption of the in-
tent to abandon. This presumption is rebuttable and therefore the
issue certainly is debatable. Without attempting to answer the ques-
tion of whether there has been abandonment, the circumstances at a
minimum might suggest that "the United States does not have a
clear right under American law to line the All-American Canal to the
detriment of Mexican farmers who have put the water to beneficial
use for 25 years." 79
In addition to these issues from western water decisions, Mexico
could argue the ambiguity of groundwater under the Treaty, plus
possibly the establishment of a prescriptive right due to Mexico's
long use of the water combined with the non-use in the United
States. Abandonment and prescription are cousins--one focuses on
long non-use, the other on long use.
Perhaps the most important lesson we can learn from the cases
is that they fundamentally reflect a general need to reach an equita-
ble accommodation between those who seek to recapture "lost"
seepage waters and those who have become dependent on their use.
This surely has to be the case in the All-American Canal situation.
We should seek to avoid a damaging conflict over these seepage wa-
ters. We should seek an equitable accommodation if, in fact, it is
determined that the proposed conservation and transfer of waters of
the Imperial Irrigation District would adversely affect groundwater
users in Mexico. Accordingly, suitable provisions should be made to
protect the Mexican users, perhaps through water replacement
measures. Neither international law nor the Treaty addresses the
question directly; but the broadly recognized principles of western
water law of the United States itself provide that water should be
captured and transferred only if the transfer can be made "without
detriment to the rights of other water users ... ."80
Furthermore, various steps should be taken in the proposed Im-
perial Irrigation District transfer. First, hydrologic studies should
79 See Hayes, supra note 60.
80 W.S. Ranch Co. v. Kaiser Steel Co., 79 N.M. 65, 69, 439 P.2d 714, 718 (1968).
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carefully determine whether in fact Mexican groundwater users
would be adversely affected. 8 ' If they would not be, then the ques-
tion would be moot. If they would be adversely affected, then meas-
ures to mitigate the detrimental impacts, such as replacement water
or compensation, should be considered. In this, what appears to be
a worthy project could go forward while avoiding damage to estab-
lished users across the international boundary. Instead of a zero
sum game, in which one party gains only at the expense of the other
party, a "win-win" approach should be sought. San Diego and Los
Angeles undoubtedly need additional water. Mexicali and Tijuana
undoubtedly need more water. Lining the All-American Canal un-
doubtedly would capture water lost to seepage. Perhaps a portion of
this conserved water could be delivered directly through closed
pipes, for example, to replace lost groundwater supplies and the re-
mainder could be delivered to Los Angeles and San Diego as con-
templated under the proposal. Perhaps discharge water from the
planned International Sewage Treatment Plant in San Diego could
be provided to Tijuana to offset losses of seepage waters from the
All-American Canal. Perhaps other "creative" replacement water
options could be considered. Mexican users would be protected,
and coastal areas of southern California would receive additional
water supplies, even if in somewhat reduced quantities.
An equally important benefit would be the avoidance of a dis-
pute which could damage U.S.-Mexican relations. The political costs
could be greater than the hydrologic gains. This consideration is
particularly crucial because the two nations have common interests
in a whole spectrum of issues ranging from trade to drug enforce-
ment to energy to immigration. These issues will continue to require
mutual cooperation.
Resort to legal arguments, based either on western water law
decisions or international treaty interpretations, are unlikely to reach
a conclusion acceptable to both nations. Rather, a negotiated agree-
ment between the two nations should be patiently pursued. Such an
approach would obtain the benefits which accompany an amicable
resolution through mutual agreement. In pursuing this "amicable"
approach, the hydrologic realities of supplying replacement water to
Mexican users should be carefully explored.
Rather than playing a total zero sum game, we should seek ways
to share the gains of the water saved by lining. Rather than the total
loser of the water saved being the one upon whom the last domino
falls, perhaps the water "saved" by the lining of the Canal could be
81 Hydrologic determinations are seldom simple, and all of the seepage may not
reach Mexico. Therefore reliable hydrologic studies would have to be carried out which
are satisfactory to both countries. Agreement on the basic factual data is a necessary first
step.
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equitably shared. Accordingly, the southern California cities would
gain substantial new water even if less than the full amount they had
hoped for, and the Mexican cities would not lose all of their supple-
mental supplies (even though they would perhaps receive less than
they now do).
Perhaps rather than following a strict interpretation of the letter
of the treaty law regarding surface flows, the United States would be
better served in the longer run by following the wisdom of equity.
As they say, "what goes around, comes around!"

